DragonGate badge DragonGate ← The Happy Pixel Co.
DragonGate — silver dragon and star badge

DRAGONGATE

Secure Access. Anywhere. Zero Trust.
MILITARY GRADE ACCESS CONTROL

Self-hosted, zero-trust network access — the convenience of modern cloud access tools, owned end to end by you. Deployable inside a fully air-gapped enclave or across the open internet, from one codebase, on a WireGuard data plane.

Technical Specifications

No mystery boxes. This is what DragonGate is made of.

ArchitectureFour cooperating services + admin CLI: Controller (source of truth: users, devices, resources, policies, key distribution), Connector (outbound-only gateway inside each private segment), Client (per-device agent, split-tunnel routing), Relay (NAT-traversal broker that only ever sees ciphertext), and dgctl for administration.
Language100% memory-safe Rust — every crate compiled with #![forbid(unsafe_code)]. Whole classes of exploits (buffer overflows, use-after-free) are ruled out at compile time.
Data planeWireGuard tunnel: X25519 key exchange, ChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption, BLAKE2s hashing.
Control planeMutual TLS 1.3 (ECDHE + AEAD) — both sides authenticate with certificates on every connection. No passwords on the wire, ever.
PKIBuilt-in internal certificate authority (ECDSA P-256), designed for an HSM-backed root. Your infrastructure, your CA — no third-party certificate dependency required.
Crypto backendsSwappable at build time: ring (default) or AWS-LC in FIPS mode for deployments that require a FIPS 140-3 validated module. The FIPS profile compiles and passes the full control-plane test suite. (Module validation itself is an external certification process.)
AuthenticationPIV/CAC smart cards and FIDO2 hardware keys, against a local directory (air-gapped) or your OIDC/SAML identity provider (networked).
Zero-trust modelDeny by default. Every resource requires an explicit grant; grants are short-lived and device-bound; revocation is immediate. Being "on the network" grants exactly nothing.
AuditFull audit log of grants and access with a cryptographically signed head (ECDSA P-256 / SHA-256) — tamper-evident by design.
Deployment profilesEnclave: fully air-gapped — local auth, controller-as-CA, signed offline update bundles, zero external dependencies, zero telemetry. Networked: internet-reachable with relays and optional IdP integration. Same codebase, one build.

Threat Model

Designed against real adversaries, not marketing ones.

Attacker already on your LANNo implicit access — every resource needs an explicit grant. The network location means nothing.
Stolen or lost deviceIdentity is bound to the device and revocable; short-lived grants expire on their own.
Compromised relayRelays broker only WireGuard ciphertext. They cannot decrypt, inspect, or inject into a session.
Network eavesdropperWireGuard-encrypted data plane, mutual-TLS control plane. Nothing readable on the wire.
Malicious insiderPer-resource least privilege plus a tamper-evident audit log of every grant and access.
No internet at allController-as-CA, local auth, offline signed updates — the Enclave profile has zero external dependencies.

Project Status

DragonGate is in active development by The Happy Pixel Company. The control plane, internal CA, and a userspace WireGuard data plane are building today — the architecture, threat model, and cryptography above are specified and under construction on a milestone roadmap toward first production deployments. Interested in early access, a pilot, or a custom build on this foundation? Talk to us.
Talk To Us About DragonGate
Custom software engineered to military-grade standards · The Happy Pixel Company · St. Petersburg, FL